Adversarial examples are known to mislead deep learning models to incorrectly classify them, even in domains where such models achieve state of the art performance. Until recently, research on both attack and defense methods focused on image recognition, mostly using convolutional neural networks. In recent years, adversarial example generation methods for recurrent neural networks (RNNs) have been published, demonstrating that RNN classifiers are vulnerable as well. In this paper, we present five novel defense methods to make RNN classifiers more robust against such attacks, as opposed to previous defense methods, which where designed only for non-sequence based models. We evaluate our methods against state of the art attacks in the cyber security domain, where real adversaries (malware developers) exist, but our methods can be applied against any sequence based adversarial attack, e.g., in the NLP domain. Using our methods we decrease such attack effectiveness from 99.9% to 15%.
Introduction
The growing use of deep learning in fields like computer vision and natural language processing (NLP) [19] , has been accompanied by increased interest in the domain of adversarial learning, that is, attacking and defending deep learning models algorithmically. Of special interest are adversarial examples, which are samples modified in order to be misclassified by the attacked classifier. Most of the research in deep adversarial learning has focused on the computer vision domain, and more specially, in the image recognition domain, and therefore focused mostly on convolutional neural networks (CNNs), commonly used in this domain [2] . In recent years, more and more adversarial example generation methods were presented in the NLP domain, in order to bypass, e.g., sentiment analysis classifiers, which are usually RNN classifiers [11] . Those attacks were also extended into the cyber security domain. For instance, attacks were developed against dynamic analysis which is based on RNN classifiers that use the API calls of a running process as features [24] . This domain raises special interest, because it contains adversaries: malware developers, who want to evade next generation machine and deep learning based classifiers [1] . While attacks have been presented against RNN classifiers, to the best of our knowledge, there is currently no published and evaluated method to make an RNN model resistant to adversarial sequences, and this paper is the first to address it.
In the cyber security domain, adversarial learning is not only used to increase the accuracy of a classifier on out-ofdistribution input; it is also used to attack real-world classifiers [4] , making such research critical. For this reason, we focused on this domain and not, for instance, on the more heavily researched NLP domain. However, the methods presented in this paper can be extended to all domains where the input is a sequence, such as NLP.
The contributions of our paper are as follows: 1) We present sequence squeezing, a novel defense method that reduces the adversarial space and limits the possibility of generating adversarial input sequences. This reduction is conducted without modifying the classifier, and uses a dedicated sequence transformation, since the currently published input transformations used for image based feature squeezing, such as reducing the image depth, do not fit sequences.
2) We present a novel method to detect adversarial examples using their out-of-distribution statistical properties, leveraging the correlation between items inside the sequence, which does not exist in previous papers, which use nonsequence inputs.
3) We present a defense method that uses different input subsequences (starting at various offsets inside the full sequences) as a training set for models in an ensemble, preventing adversarial examples with localized modification from fooling the entire ensemble. This cannot be done for nonsequence input. 4) We present a defense method that trains a generative adversarial network (GAN) on the training set and uses its output that is closest to the original input, in order to omit the adversarial perturbations before classification. GANs used for image generation cannot be used here, because the discrete outputs from the generative model make it difficult to pass the gradient update from the discriminative model to the generative model. We also evaluate the usage of our diverse training set instead of the GAN's output in a different defense method, named nearest neighbor.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no paper addressing defense methods against RNN adversarial attacks at all, and particularly not in the cyber security domain, in which adversaries (malware developers) actually exist. Our methods reduce the number of adversarial examples evading the classifier by more than 85%.
One might claim that a defense method that blocks only 85% or even 99% of the adversarial examples is insufficient in certain domains, such as the cyber security domain, since in this case an adversary would likely try an adversarial example of a specific malware, and if it is blocked, try an adversarial example of another malware, and so on, until reaching a malware that evades the classifier. However, in real-life scenarios, an adversary does not want to infect a target with any malware -the attacker wants to infect a target with a specific, perhaps specially crafted, malware (e.g., the WannaCry ransomware, Cosmic-Duke APT, etc.). If this adversarial example cannot evade the malware classifier, the attacker must invest a lot of time generating another specific malware to use against the target host(s). In this paper, blocking an adversarial example for a specific sample means that the sample is blocked regardless of how many modifications the attack adds to it (up to the limit of 67% additional API calls, specified in Appendix C). Thus, samples whose adversarial variants are blocked cannot evade detection and infect the protected host simply by adding more perturbations. Thus, defense methods that blocks 85% of the attacks have value even in challenging domains such as cyber security.
2 Background and Related Work
RNN Adversarial Examples
The search for adversarial examples is formalized as a minimization problem [5, 28] :
The input x, correctly classified by the classifier f , is perturbed with r such that the resulting adversarial example x + r remains in the input domain D but is assigned a different label than x. To solve Equation 1, we need to transform the constraint f (x + r) = f (x) into an optimizable formulation. Then we can easily use the Lagrange multiplier to solve it.
To do this, we define a loss function Loss() to quantify this constraint. This loss function can be the same as the training loss, or it can be chosen differently, e.g., hinge loss or cross entropy loss.
Most sequence based adversarial attacks take place in the natural language processing (NLP) domain, where changing a word can change the meaning of the sentence. For instance, changing: "This is the best movie have I ever seen" to: "This is the worst movie I have ever seen."
Papernot et al. [21] presented a white-box adversarial example attack against RNNs, demonstrated against LSTM architecture, for sentiment classification of a movie review dataset, where the input is the review and the output is whether the review was positive or negative. The adversary iterates over the words x[i] in the review and modifies it as follows:
) provides the direction one has to perturb each of the word embedding components in order to reduce the probability assigned to the current class, and thus change the class assigned to the sentence. This approach of modifying a word by the gradient is commonly used in many papers to achieve maximum classification impact with a minimal amount of changes.
Gao et al. [11] attack sentiment classification models in a black-box setting by either inserting, deleting, or swapping characters to generate misspelled words mapped into the 'unknown' word in the NLP dictionary, using various scoring functions to find the most important words to modify. Other than attacking text classifiers, [17] aims to fool reading comprehension systems by adding misleading sentences.
Generative adversarial network (GAN) is used in [32] to craft natural adversarial examples. Seq2seq models are attacked in [9, 10] which uses a word-level attack method (where the latter focuses on adding specific "malicious" keywords to the adversarial sentence). Alzantot et al. [3] present an attack algorithm that exploits population based gradient-free optimization via genetic algorithms.
Attacks have also been implemented in the cyber security domain, mainly for malware classifiers based on API calls. The cyber security domain is extremely relevant, because in this domain adversaries exist -malware writers, who want their malware to evade the detection of next generation, machine learning based malware classifiers. Several attacks in the cyber security domain have been presented: A generative RNN based approach was proposed in [15] , in which invalid APIs are generated and inserted into the original API sequences. Rosenberg et al. [24] presented a black-box variant of the attack in [21] , by creating a substitute model and attacking it using a similar method, and extended it to hybrid classifiers combining static and dynamic features and architectures. A black-box attack based on benign perturbations generated using a GAN that was trained on benign samples was presented in [23] .
Defense Mechanisms against Nonsequence Based Adversarial Attacks
To the best of our knowledge, there is currently no published and evaluated method to make a sequence based RNN model resistant to adversarial sequences, beyond a brief mention of adversarial training as a defense method [3, 20] . Adversarial training has several limitations: 1) It provides a varying level of robustness, depending on the adversarial examples used.
2) It requires a dataset of adversarial examples to train on. Thus, it has limited generalization against novel adversarial attacks.
3) It requires re-training the model, which might incur significant overhead, if the training set is large. Our paper is the first to present and evaluate defense methods for RNN classifiers, presenting five novel defense methods and comparing them to adversarial training.
Several methods have been suggested to detect whether a sample is an adversarial example.
Grosse et al. [12] leverage the fact that adversarial samples usually have a different distribution than normal samples. The statistical differences between them can be detected using a high-dimensional statistical test of maximum mean discrepancy or by adding another class of adversarial examples to the classifier. In contrast to our work, this paper deals with non-sequential input only.
Xu et al. [29] uses feature squeezing to detect adversarial examples. This is done by reducing the search space available to an adversary by coalescing samples that correspond to many different feature vectors in the original space into a single sample; this is accomplished by applying various image-specific dimensionality reduction transformations to the input features. If the original and squeezed inputs produce substantially different outputs from the model, the input is likely to be adversarial. In contrast to our work, this study deals with feedforward networks (mostly CNNs), in the computer vision domain.
Instead of actively trying to detect adversarial examples, another approach is to passively try to make the classifier more robust against such attacks. Such methods avoid the false positives that might happen in the abovementioned techniques.
Adversarial training was suggested in [28] , which demonstrated the injection of correctly labeled adversarial samples in the training set as a means of making the model robust.
Using an ensemble of DNNs as a classifier resistant to adversarial attacks on images was shown in [27] . In contrast to our work, this paper deals with feed forward networks (mostly CNN) only, in the computer vision domain.
Stokes et al. [26] evaluate three defense methods: weight decay, ensemble of classifiers, and distillation for a dynamic analysis malware classifier based on a non-sequence based deep neural network. A GAN was trained to model the distribution of unperturbed images in [25] . At inference time, the closest output (which does not contain the adversarial changes) to the input image is found. This generated image is then fed to the classifier, and its prediction is used as the prediction of the original input. In contrast to our work, this paper only deals with feedforward networks (mostly CNNs) in the computer vision domain.
Methodology
We investigate six main approaches, presented in the following subsections. Each such method is either attack-specific, meaning it requires adversarial examples generated by the attack algorithm the method is trying to defend against, or attack-agnostic, that is, it works against all types of adversarial examples, without the need to have a dataset of such examples, making them a preferable choice, all things equal.
Attack-Agnostic Defense Methods

Sequence Squeezing
The rationale of sequence squeezing is coalescing samples that correspond to many different feature vectors in the original space into a single vector that preserves the original meaning. If the original and squeezed inputs produce substantially different outputs from the model, the input is likely to be adversarial and the features before squeezing might be the adversarial perturbation. The squeezed input is classified using the original classifier without retraining it, while reducing the search space available to an adversary by merging semantic similar features to a single representative feature. For instance, a malware trying to communicate with a CNC server would prefer to use HttpSendRequestA(). However, this API is commonly used by malware and would be detected by malware classifiers. Thus, an adversarial example would use HttpSendRequestW() after converting the ANSI request to Unicode instead, to evade detection. Using sequence squeezing, both HttpSendRequestA() and HttpSendRequestW(), which have similar semantic meaning (here: functionality), would be squeezed into a single feature group, represented by HttpSendRequestA(), which better represents the group's semantic meaning, due to its common use. The classifier would see the HttpSendRequestA() in the input sequence instead of HttpSendRequestW(), and this evasion attack would be blocked.
Xu et al. used image-specific dimensionality reduction transformations to the input features, such as changing the image color depth (e.g., from 24 bit to 8 bit) as a method to detect adversarial examples for images, termed feature squeezing [29] . However, when applying feature squeezing to discrete sequence input (e.g., API call trace input for malware classification or words for sentiment analysis), such transformations make no sense. We therefore implement a different method from scratch, preserving the semantic meaning of input sequences, while being generic enough to be applied in the cyber security domain, as well as other sequence based domains, such as NLP. This method is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Our method consists of the following stages: 1) Calculate word embedding, representing each API call/word in the vocabulary in a semantic-preserving fashion, that is, words with similar meaning have closer word embeddings. 2) Merge the closest (=most similar) words to a single center of mass in order to reduce the dimensionality of the vocabulary (and the freedom degrees of the adversary). 3) Replace all of the words which are part of the merged group with the word closest to the center of mass of this group, keeping both lower dimensionality and the word embeddings used by the original classifier, so it can be used with the squeezed input without retraining. 4) Apply the transformation (steps 1..3) on the classifier's input sequence. If the classifier's confidence score of the squeezed sequence is substantially different from the confidence score of the original input (the threshold appears in Equation 3), the sample is adversarial.
The input sequence transformation is shown in Algorithm 1. for the two Euclidean closest word embeddings in newEmbed, w i , w j :
# Calculate center of mass for the merged embedding We used GloVe [22] word embedding, which, in contrast to other methods (e.g., word2vec), has been shown to work effectively with API call traces [14] , to generate embed, the word embedding matrix (of size:|D| × d, where d is the embedding dimensionality) for each API call/word (line 2). We then perform agglomerative (bottom-up) hierarchical clustering on the word embeddings: We merge the closest word embedding (using Euclidean distance, as in [3] -line 7, as no significant improvement was observed when using cosine distance). Each time we merge two embeddings, we replace them with their center of mass, which becomes the embedding of the merged group, to which each of the merged embedding is mapped (lines [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . This use of the center of mass preserves the overall semantic of the group and allows us to keep merging the most semantically similar words into groups, even to groups which were previously merged. After merging is done, we replace each merged group's center of mass embedding with the closest (based on the Euclidean distance) original word merged into it, so we can use the original classifier which was trained on the original embeddings (line 16). The rationale for this is that we want to choose the API or word with the closest semantic meaning to the merged group members (represented by the merged group's center of mass embedding), in order to maintain the performance of the original classifier.
To detect adversarial examples, we run the original classifier twice: once for the original input and once for the sequence squeezed input. If the difference of the confidence scores of the results is larger than T hreshold adv , we say that the original input is adversarial. We chose T hreshold adv to be the maximum difference between the input and the squeezed input of all of the samples in the training set. Thus, this is the minimal threshold that would not affect the training set classification (and thus the original classifier training).
This defense method training overhead is low: iterating the training set to calculate the squeezing transformation. No classifier retraining with the squeezed vectors takes place; the original classifier is still being used. The inference overhead is also low: classifying each sample twice (once with the input sequence and once with the squeezed sequence) using the original classifier.
Defense Sequence-GAN
One way to filter out the perturbations added by adversarial attack is to train a GAN to model the distribution of unperturbed input. At inference time, the closest output (which does not contain the out-of-distribution perturbation) to the input Figure 1 : Overview of the Sequence Squeezing Method is found. This generated input is then fed to the classifier, and its prediction is used as the prediction of the original input.
Samangouei et al. [25] presented Defense-GAN, in which a GAN was trained to model the distribution of unperturbed images. However, Defense-GAN is defined for real-valued data only, while API calls of a malware classifier are discrete symbols. Small perturbations required by such GANs are not applicable for discrete API calls. For instance, you can't change WriteFile() to WriteFile()+0.001 in order to estimate the gradient to perturb the adversarial example in the right direction; you need to modify it to an entirely different API. The discrete outputs from the generative model make it difficult to pass the gradient update from the discriminative model to the generative model. We therefore used Sequence-GANs, i.e., GAN architectures designed to produce sequences, to adapt this method for input sequences.
Several Sequence-GAN types were evaluated. For each Sequence-GAN type, we trained a Sequence-GAN per class. In this study, it means a "benign Sequence-GAN" to produce API call sequences drawn from the benign distribution used to train the GAN and a "malicious Sequence-GAN" for malicious API call sequences. For a given input sequence, m benign API call sequences are generated by the "benign GAN," and m malicious API call sequences are generated by the "malicious GAN." We calculated the Euclidean distance (no significant improvement was observed when using the cosine distance) between the input and each of the 2m generated sequences, choosing the nearest sequence to the original input sequence. We then returned the classifier's prediction for the nearest sequence to the input sequence. The Defense Sequence-GAN method is illustrated in Figure 2 . The Sequence-GAN types we evaluated are:
SeqGAN In SeqGAN [30] implementation, a discriminative model is trained to minimize the binary classification loss between real benign API call sequences and generated ones. In addition to the pretraining procedure that uses the MLE (maximum likelihood estimation) metric, the generator is modeled as a stochastic policy in reinforcement learning (RL), bypassing the generator differentiation problem by directly performing a gradient policy update. Given the API sequence s t = [x 0 , x 1 , ..x t−1 ] and the next API to be sampled from the model x t ∼ (x|s t ), the RL algorithm, REINFORCE, optimizes the GAN objective:
The RL reward signal comes from the GAN discriminator, judged on a complete sequence, and is passed back to the intermediate state-action steps using Monte Carlo search, in order to compute the Q-value for generating each token. This approach is used , for variance reduction.
TextGAN Zhang et al. [31] proposed a method that optimizes the Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) loss, which is the reconstructed feature distance, by adding a reconstruction term in the objective.
GSGAN The Gumbel Softmax trick is a reparametrization trick used to replace the multinomial stochastic sampling in text generation [18] . The paper uses argmax[so f tmax(h + g)] = so f tmax(h), where g is a Gumbel distribution with zero mean and unit variance. Since this process is differentiable, backpropagation can be directly applied to optimize the GAN objective.
MaliGAN The basic structure of MaliGAN [8] follows that of SeqGAN. To stabilize the training and alleviate the gradient saturating problem, MaliGAN rescales the reward in a batch.
This defense method training overhead is high (training two GANs with stable performance). The inference overhead is also high: generating 2m sequences using the two GANs and finding the minimal distance from the input sequence.
Nearest Neighbor
In this method, instead of returning the classifier score for the input sequence, we return the score of the training set sample closest to it, using the Euclidean distance (again, no significant improvement was observed using the cosine distance). This method leverages the fact that adversarial examples try to add minimal perturbation to the input sample (Equation 1), so most parts of the input sequence remain identical to the source (in this case, malicious) class, and the distance from it would be minimal, thus classifying the input sequence correctly despite the adversarial perturbation. Note that this method is similar to Defense Sequence-GAN (presented in Section 3.1.2), however, instead of using the GAN output closest to the input sequence, we used the training set sample closest to the input sequence.
This defense method has no training overhead (the classifier training does not change). However, the inference overhead is high: finding the minimal distance of the input sequence from all the training set vectors. This overhead can be reduced, e.g., by clustering all the training set vectors and then use the input sequence distance from their centroids. However, this would negatively affect the method's detection rate due to the lower granularity.
RNN Ensemble
An ensemble of models represents a detour from the basic premise of deep neural networks (including recurrent neural networks): training a single classifier on all of the data to obtain the best performance, while overfitting is handled using different mechanisms, such as dropout. However, an ensemble of models can be used to mitigate adversarial examples. An adversarial example is crafted to bypass a classifier looking at all of the input. Thus, an ensemble of models, each focusing on a subset of the input features, is more robust, since the models trained on the input subsets would not be effected by perturbations conducted on other input subsets.
Since adversarial examples are usually constructed with minimum amount of localized perturbations in the input sequence (Equation 1), they would affect only small number of models, but would be detected by, e.g., ensemble majority voting.
The use of ensemble of models as a defense method against adversarial examples for images was suggested in [27] . However, it presented only the first two types of models mentioned in this paper (regular and bagging) and only a single decision method (hard voting), while we leverage ensemble models that provide better accuracy for sequence based models, e.g., subsequence models.
We evaluate four types of ensemble models:
1. Regular models -Each model is trained on the entire training set and all the input sequences. The difference between the models in the ensemble is due to the training method: each model would have different initial (random) weights and the training optimizer that can converge to a different function in each model, due to the optimizer's "stochasticness" (e.g., a stochastic gradient descent optimizer picking different sample mini-batches and therefore converges to a different loss function's local minimum of the neural network). Note that the starting offsets can also be randomized per submodel, instead of fixed as done in this paper. The idea is that the models which classify an API trace of an adversarial example in a subsequence without a perturbed part (i.e.,a purely malicious trace) would be classified correctly, while the perturbed parts would be divided and analyzed separately, making it easier to detect that the trace is not benign.
The output of the ensemble was calculated using one of two possible methods: 1) Hard voting -Every model predicts its own classification, and the final classification is selected by majority voting. 2) Soft voting -Every model calculates its own confidence score. The average confidence score is used to determine the classification. Soft voting gives "confident" models more power than hard voting. This defense method does not require knowledge about the adversarial examples during its setup in order to mitigate them, making it attack-agnostic, with the exception of adversarial models, which are attack-specific, based on the definition provided earlier in Section 3. This defense method training overhead is high (training the number of models in the ensemble instead of a single model). The inference overhead is also high: running an inference for each model in the ensemble instead of once.
Attack-Specific Defense Methods
Statistical Sequence Irregularity Detection (a.k.a. Adversarial Signatures)
Adversarial examples are frequently out-of-distribution samples. Since the target classifier was not trained on samples from this distribution, generalization to adversarial examples is difficult. However, this different distribution can also differentiate between adversarial and non-adversarial samples. Our method searchs for subsequences of API calls that exist only (or mainly) in adversarial examples, and not in regular samples, in order to detect if the sample is adversarial. We call those subsequences adversarial signatures.
Grosse et al. [12] leverage the fact that adversarial samples have a different distribution than normal samples for nonsequential input. The statistical differences between them can be detected using a high-dimensional statistical test of maximum mean discrepancy. In contrast, our method handles sequential input and leverages the conditional probabilities between the sequence elements (API calls or words) instead of the maximum mean discrepancy.
In order to do that, we start from the observation that in an API call trace, as well as in natural language sentences, there is a strong dependence between the sequence elements. The reason for this is that an API call (or a word in NLP) is rarely independent, and in order to produce usable business logic, a sequence of API calls (each relying on the previous API calls' output and functionality) must be implemented. For instance, the API call closesocket() would appear only after the API call socket(). The same is true for sentences: an adverb would follow a verb, etc. Since for most state of the art adversarial examples, only a small fraction of API calls is added to the original malicious trace, the malicious context (the original surrounding API calls of the original business logic) remains. Thus, we evaluated the probability of a certain API call subsequences to appear, generating "signatures" of API call subsequences that are more likely to appear in adversarial sequences, since they contain API calls (the adversarial-added API calls) unrelated to their context. We decided to analyze the statistical irregularities in ngrams of consecutive API calls. The trade-off when choosing n is to have a long enough n-gram to capture the irregularity in the proper context (surrounding API calls), while remaining short enough to allow generalization to other adversarial examples. For each unique API call (the features used in [15, 24] ) n-gram, we calculate the adversarial n-gram probability of the n-gram of monitored API calls (w 1 , w 2 .., w n )|{w 1 , w 2 .., w n } ⊆ D, where D is the vocabulary of available features. Here those features are all of the API calls recorded by the classifier.
⊥ is the concatenation operation. The adversarial n-gram probability is the ratio of occurrences of the n-gram in the adversarial example dataset available to the defender X adv , as part of the occurrences in both the adversarial examples and target (i.e., benign) class samples in the training set, X train,target . Note that the equation is valid regardless of |X adv |, and there is no assumption regarding the ratio between |X adv | and |X train,target |.
The reason we don't include malicious samples is that we want statistical irregularities from the target class, which is the benign class in this case. Also note that we only look at the appearance of the signatures in the target class and not in other classes (i.e., we look only at the benign class and not the malicious class). The reason for this is that it makes sense that X adv would contain API n-grams available in the source class (the malicious class in this paper), because in practice, it is a source class sample.
We say that the n-gram of monitored API calls (w 1 , w 2 .., w n ) is an adversarial signature if the adversarial n-gram probability of this n-gram is larger than a threshold T hresholdP adv that is determined by the trade-off between the adversarial example detection rate and the number of target class samples falsely detected as adversarial; the higher the threshold, the lower both would be.
We classify a sample as an adversarial example if it contains more than T hresholdSigs adv adversarial signatures. The more irregular n-grams detected, the more likely the sequence is to be adversarial.
This defense method requires a dataset of adversarial examples, X adv , during its setup in order to make it robust against such examples, making it attack-specific, based on the definition provided earlier in Section 3. Note that while finding "non-adversarial signatures" using this method is possible, it is more problematic, especially when |X train,target | is very large. Other methods presented in this paper, such as Defense-Sequence-GAN (Section 3.1.2), implement this approach more efficiently. This defense method training overhead is high (counting all subsequences of certain size in the training set). The inference overhead, however, is low: searching for the adversarial signatures in the input sequence.
Adversarial Training
Adversarial training is the method of adding adversarial examples, with their actual label (as opposed to the target class label), to the training set of the classifier. The rationale for this is that since adversarial examples are usually out-of-distribution samples, inserting them into the training set would cause the classifier to learn the entire training set distribution, including the adversarial examples.
Unlike all other methods mentioned in this paper, this method has already been tried for sequence based input in the NLP domain ( [3, 20] ), with mixed results about the robustness it provides against adversarial attacks. Additional issues regarding this method are described in Section 2.2. We evaluate this method in order to determine whether the cyber security domain, with a much smaller dictionary (less than 400 API call types monitored in [24] , in contrast to millions of possible words in NLP domains), would yield different results. We also want to compare it to the novel defense methods presented in this paper, using the same training set, classifier, etc.
This defense method training overhead is high (generating many adversarial examples, following by training a classifier on a training set containing them). However, inference overhead does not exist: the inference is simply being performed on the newly trained classifier.
Experimental Evaluation
Dataset and Target Malware Classifiers
We use the same dataset used in [24] , because of its size: it contains 500,000 files (250,000 benign samples and 250,000 malware samples), faithfully representing the malware families in the wild and allowing us a proper setting for attack and defense method comparison. Details are provided in Appendix A. Each sample was run in Cuckoo Sandbox, a malware analysis system, for two minutes per sample. The API call sequences generated by the inspected code during its execution were extracted from the JSON file generated by Cuckoo Sandbox. The extracted API call sequences are used as the malware classifier's features. The samples were run on Windows 8.1 OS, since most malware targets the Windows OS. Anti-sandbox malware was filtered to prevent dataset contamination (see Appendix A). After filtering, the final training set size is 360,000 samples, 36,000 of which serve as the validation set. The test set size is 36,000 samples. All sets are balanced between malicious and benign samples. Due to hardware limitations, a subset of the dataset was used as a training set: 54,000 training samples and test and validation sets of 6,000 samples each. The dataset was representative and maintained the same distribution as the dataset described above.
There are no commercial trail version or open-source API call based deep learning intrusion detection systems available (such commercial products target enterprises and involve supervised server installation). Dynamic models are also not available in free online malware scanning services like Virus-Total. Therefore, we used RNN based malware classifiers, trained on the API call traces generated by the abovementioned dataset. The API call sequences are split into windows of m API calls each, and each window is classified in turn. Thus, the input of all of the classifiers is a vector of m = 140 (larger window sizes didn't improve the classifier's accuracy) API call types with 314 possible values (those monitored by Cuckoo Sandbox). The classifiers used are similar to those used in [24] to evaluate the attacks which we use to evaluate our defense methods. Their implementation, hyperparameters (loss function, dropout, activation functions, etc.), and performance of the target classifiers are described in Appendix B.
Defense Method Performance
The different defense methods mentioned in Section 3 are measured using two factors:
The adversarial recall is the fraction of adversarial sequences generated by the attack which were either detected by the defense method, or classified as malicious by the classifier. Adversarial recall provides a metric for the robustness of the classifier combined with a defense method against a specific adversarial attack.
The classifiers' performance was measured using the accuracy ratio, which applies equal weight to both FPs and FNs (unlike precision or recall), thereby providing an unbiased overall performance indicator. The accuracy is evaluated against the regular test set only. Using this method, we verify the effect our defense methods have on the classifier performance for non adversarial samples. Since samples classified as adversarial examples are automatically classified as malicious (because there is no reason for a benign adversarial example), every benign sample classified as an adversarial example would damage the classifier's accuracy.
The attacks used to assess the defense methods' robustness are described in Appendix C (there are very few such attack published). The attacks add API calls to the API trace (not removing or modifying API calls, in order to avoid damaging the modified code functionality) based on either their gradients, maximizing the effect of each added API call, or randomly. The maximum number of allowed adversarial API calls is 93 in each sliding window of n = 140 API calls (66.67%, a very permissive boundary). Three attacks are used to evaluate the robustness of our defense methods: 1. A realistic gradient-based black-box attack, in which the attacker has no knowledge of the target classifier's architecture or weights and has to build a substitute model, as done in [24] . The hold-out dataset size to build the substitute model was identical (70 samples) for a fair comparison. The attack effectiveness for the LSTM classifier (without any defense methods) is 99.99%.
2.
A white-box gradient based attack, where the adversary uses the target classifier instead of a substitute model. The attack effectiveness for the LSTM classifier (without any defense methods) is 100.00%
3.
A random perturbation attack. The attack effectiveness for the LSTM classifier (without any defense methods) is 22.97% (average of 5 runs).
The performance of the attack versus the various defense methods and the classifiers' performance using those defense methods for the LSTM classifier (other tested classifiers, mentioned in Appendix B, behave the same) are presented in Table  1 . The overhead column contains high-level observations of the defense method overhead (non, low or high), both during training (time and money) and during inference (run time performance). The analysis is detailed in Section 3's subsections. As models get more complicated and larger in size, we would expect lower-overhead defenses to be more easily deployed in real world scenarios. Table 1 reveals several interesting issues:
The evaluated defense methods usually provide better robustness against white-box attacks than against black-box attacks. This suggests that transferable adversarial examples, the ones bypassing the substitute model and are also effective against another classifier (the target model), as done in the black-box attack, are different from other adversarial examples (e.g., drawn from a different distribution), causing defense methods to be less effective against them. For instance, transferable adversarial examples might contain adversarial API calls with semantic similar meaning to the API calls of the original benign sample, making sequence squeezing less effective. Analyzing the differences between black-box and white-box RNN adversarial examples and their effect on our proposed defense methods would be part of our future work.
All evaluated defense methods provide adequate robustness against random perturbation attack. However, as shown earlier in Section 4.2, this attack is less effective than other attack types, and is ineffective even when no defense method is applied.
The accuracy of the RNN ensembles is higher than the original classifier for all ensemble types. The RNN subsequence ensembles also provide good robustness against whitebox attacks, while the non-subsequence ensembles provide good robustness against black-box attacks. Bagging and adversarial models do not affect the performance when adding them to the subsequence or regular models. On the other hand, an ensemble requires the training of many models. This affect both the training time and the prediction time: Ensemble of nine models like in this study, requires nine times the training time and the inference time is nine times longer . One might claim that the improvement of RNN subsequence ensemble classifiers for non adversarial samples results from the fact that those classifiers consider more API calls in each sliding window (230 API calls in all 9 models, instead of 140 API calls in a single model). However, testing larger API calls sliding window for a single classifier (1000 API calls in [24] ) did not result in a similar improvement. This leads us to believe that the improved performance actually derive from the ensemble itself and not from the input size. This is supported by the improvement in non subsequence ensembles.
The sequence squeezing defense method provides good robustness against white-box attacks but is less effective against black-box attacks. This defense method causes small decrease in the classifier performance (about 1%), and doubles the prediction time, because two models are being run: the original and the sequence squeezed models.
The adversarial signatures defense method provides the best black-box attack robustness, but its white-box attack performance is lower than sequence squeezing.
The adversarial training defense method underperforms in comparison to all other evaluated (and novel) defense methods, since its adversarial recall is lower.
For the Defense Sequence-GAN method, the inability of the sequence-based GANs to capture the complex input sequence distribution, causes its classifier accuracy against nonadversarial samples to be the lowest compared to all other defense methods and the original classifier, making Defense Sequence-GAN (currently) unusable in real world scenarios.
Given the low accuracy of the classifier on non-adversarial samples when using the Defense Sequence-GAN method, as opposed to the good performance of Defense GAN in the image recognition domain [25] , we hypothesize that the problem is due to the fact that the sequence based GANs we used (like SeqGAN) were unable to capture the true distribution of the input sequence and produced bad Seqence-GAN output. This was validated by analyzing the Nearest Neighbor defense method's performance. We see that for the Nearest Neighbor defense method, both the classifier accuracy for non-adversarial test set and the adversarial recall are higher. This suggests that a larger Sequence-GAN training set (which would require a stronger machine with more GPU memory than that used in this research) would result in a better approximation of the input sequence distribution by the Sequence-GAN and thus allow Defense Sequence-GAN to be as effective as the Nearest Neighbor defense method -and more generalizable to samples significantly different from the training set. Such experiments would be part of our future work.
We see that the best defense method selection depends on the specific scenario: When the training and inference overhead is not a concern, RNN subsequence ensemble provide , with lower overhead. Finally, for cases where a low overhead attack-agnostic defense method is required, sequence squeezing provides good robustness against adversarial attacks, with much lower overhead, at a price of a slight degradation in the classifier performance against non-adversarial samples. Additional details about the implementation of the defense methods are provided in the subsections that follow.
Sequence Squeezing
We used Stanford's GloVe implementation with embedding dimensionality of d = 32. The vocabulary D used by our malware classifiers contains all of the API calls monitored by Cuckoo Sandbox, documented in the Cuckoo Sandbox repository. Running Algorithm 1 on our training set (see Section 4.1) of API call traces resulted in interesting sequence squeezing. It seems that the squeezed groups maintained the "API contextual semantics" as expected, merging, for instance, the variants of the same API, e.g., GetUser-NameA() and GetUserNameW(). Other merged API calls are different API calls with the same functionality, e.g., socket() and WSASocketA(). The sequence squeezing we used, with sizeD squeezed = |D| 2 = 177, is described in Appendix D. Using smaller feature spaces, e.g., sizeD squeezed = |D| 3 , resulted inability to maintain the "API contextual semantics," merging unrelated API calls and reducing the classifier's accuracy by 7%. On the one hand, using sizeD squeezed = 2|D| 3 ,did not narrow the adversarial space enough, resulting in 5% adversarial recall loss. For our training set, we used T hreshold adv = 0.18. Other hyperparameters (grid-search selected) were less effective.
Adversarial Signatures
We chose n = 5, i.e., we used 5-grams of API calls for the "adversarial signatures." Shorter API call subsequences caused more "adversarial false positives," i.e., identifying regular samples as adversarial (e.g., n = 4 resulted in 0.5% of the test set wrongly classified as adversarial), while longer API call sequences were too specific to detect the majority of the adversarial examples (e.g., n = 6 resulted in a 15% loss of adversarial recall). We used T hresholdP adv = 1.0, thus, we looked for API subsequences which appear only in adversarial examples. We also used T hresholdSigs adv = 1, so in order to classify a sample as an adversarial example, it is enough that it contains a single adversarial signature. Other hyperparameters (grid-search selected) were less effective.
Adversarial Training
We ran the adversarial black-box attack [24] 7 times, each time on a different subset of 2,000 malicious hold-out set samples (which were not part of the training, validation, or test set). Eventually, 14,000 malicious adversarial examples replaced 14,000 malicious samples in the original training set. Other sizes (grid-search selected) resulted in a reduced accuracy.
RNN Ensemble
We used six variants of ensembles consisting of nine models: 1) Regular ensemble -Each model was trained on the entire dataset. 2) Subsequence ensemble -The first model is trained on API calls in offsets between 1..140 in the API call trace, the second model is trained on API calls in offsets 11...150 in the API call trace, etc. The ninth model is trained on API calls in the offsets 91..230 in the API call trace. 3) Bagging ensemble -Each model is trained on a random subset of the dataset, as discussed in Section 3.1.4. 4) Bagging subsequence ensemble -This is a combination of the bagging and subsequence ensembles. Each model is trained not only on a different API call offsets range (like the regular subsequence ensemble described above), but also on a random subset of the training set, as in the bagging ensemble. 5) Adversarial ensemble -Each model has 14,000 (out of 27,000) malicious samples replaced with their adversarial example variants, similar to adversarial training (see Section 3). 6) Adversarial subsequence ensemble -This is a combination of the adversarial and subsequence ensembles. The adversarial examples' API call traces used for training also starts at an offset.
The output of the ensemble was made using soft voting (see Section 3.1.4), since the difference between this and hard voting in all of our tests was marginal.
Defense Sequence-GAN
To implement the benign perturbation GAN, we tested several GAN types, using TexyGEN [33] with its default parameters. We used MLE training as the pretraining process for all of the GAN types except GSGAN, which requires no pretraining. In pretraining, we first trained 80 epochs for a generator, and then trained 80 epochs for a discriminator. The adversarial training came next. In each adversarial epoch, we updated the generator once and then updated the discriminator for 15 mini-batch gradients. We generated a window of 140 API calls, each with 314 possible API call types, in each iteration. As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, we tested several GAN implementations with discrete sequence output: : SeqGAN [30] , TextGAN [31] , GS-GAN [18] , and MaliGAN [8] . We trained our "benign GAN" using a benign hold-out set (3,000 sequences). Next, we generated m = 200 sequences with the "benign GAN," using an additional benign hold-out set (3,000 sequences) as a test set. We used the same procedure to train our "malicious GAN" and generated additional m = 200 sequences using it.
SeqGAN outperforms all other models by providing the average minimal distance (both the Euclidean distance and cosine distance provided similar results) between the 400 generated sequences and the test set vectors, meaning that the generated sequences were the closest to the requested distribution, and thus we used it.
Nearest Neighbor
The cosine distance is more effective than the Euclidean distance in many NLP tasks. However, the differences in performance due to the use of cosine distance instead of Euclidean distance were marginal, as in Section 3.1.3. Therefore, we used Euclidean distance for Nearest Neighbor calculations.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we provide five novel defense methods against RNN adversarial examples. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to focus on this challenge, which is different from defense methods against non-sequence based adversarial examples. We see that certain defense methods, such as RNN subsequence ensembles and adversarial signatures provide good robustness against adversarial attacks (75%-85% adversarial recall, see Table 1 ). Ensemble models even improve the classifier performance on non-adversarial samples. Other defense methods, such as sequence squeezing, provide lower overhead and better robustness against adversarial attacks, at the cost of degradation of the classifier accuracy against non-adversarial samples.
Our future work will focus on four directions: 1) Investigating additional defense methods (e.g., using cluster centroid distance instead of nearest neighbor to improve run-time performance) and evaluating the performance of several defense methods combined.
2) Implementing and mitigating attacks designed to bypass the defense methods discussed in this paper, as described for the image recognition domain in [7] (against detection of adversarial examples using statistical irregularities) and in [13] (against feature squeezing). For instance, an attacker can add perturbations across the entire API call sequence and not just until the classification changes, making his attack more robust against RNN subsequence model ensemble.
3) Extending our work to other domains with input sequences, such as NLP. 4) Observing the end-to-end defense performance gap (Section 4.2) points out very interesting questions. For example, is there any performance gap when the victim's model is defended using adversarial samples from white-box vs. blackbox attacks (as done in this paper)?
The increasing usage of machine learning based classifiers, such as "next generation anti virus", raises the concern of actual adversaries (the malware developers) trying to evade such systems using adversarial learning. Making such malware classifiers robust against adversarial attack is therefore important, and this paper, as well as future research in this domain, provide methods to defend classifiers that use RNNs, such as dynamic analysis API call sequence based malware classifiers, from adversarial attacks.
Appendix A: Tested Dataset
We used identical implementation details (e.g., dataset, classifier hyperparameters, etc.) as [24] , so the attacks can be compared. Those details are provided here for the reader's convenience.
An overview of the malware classification process is shown in Figure 3 , as presented in [24] . The dataset used is large and includes the latest malware variants, such as the Cerber and Locky ransomware families. Each malware type (ransomware, worms, backdoors, droppers, spyware, PUA, and viruses) has the same number of samples, in order to prevent prediction bias towards the majority class. 20% of the malware families (such as the NotPetya ransomware family) were only used in the test set to assess generalization to an unseen malware family. 80% of the malware families (such as the Virut virus family) were distributed between the training and test sets to determine the classifier's ability to generalize to samples from the same family. The temporal difference between the training set and the test set is six months (i.e., all training set samples are older than the test set samples), based on VirusTotal's 'first seen' date. The ground truth labels of the dataset were determined by Virus-Total, an online malware scanning service which contains more than 60 different security products. A sample with 15 or more positive (i.e., malware) classifications from the 60 products is considered malicious. A sample with zero positive classifications is labeled as benign. All samples with 1-14 positives were omitted to prevent false positive contamination of the dataset. Family labels for dataset balancing were taken from the Kaspersky Anti-Virus classifications.
It is crucial to prevent dataset contamination by malware that detects whether the malware is running in a Cuckoo Sandbox (or on virtual machines) and if so, quits immediately to prevent reverse engineering efforts. In those cases, the sample's label is malicious, but its behavior recorded in Cuckoo Sandbox (its API call sequence) isn't, due to its anti-forensic capabilities. To mitigate such contamination of the dataset, two countermeasures were used: 1) Considering only API call sequences with more than 15 API calls (as in [16] ) and omitting malware that detects a virtual machine (VM) and quits, and 2) Applying YARA rules to find samples trying to detect sandbox programs such as Cuckoo Sandbox and omitting all such samples. One might argue that the evasive malware that applies such anti-VM techniques are extremely challenging and relevant, however in this paper, we focus on the adversarial attack. This attack is generic enough to work for those evasive malware as well, assuming that other mitigation techniques (e.g., anti-anti-VM), would be applied. After this filtering and balancing of the benign samples, about 400,000 valid samples remained. The final training set size is 360,000 samples, 36,000 of which serve as the validation set. The test set size is 36,000 samples. All sets are balanced between malicious and benign samples.
Due to hardware limitations, a subset of the dataset was used as a training set: 54,000 training samples and test and validation sets of 6,000 samples each. The dataset was representative and maintained the same distribution as the dataset described above.
Appendix B: Tested Malware Classifiers
As mentioned in Section 4, we used the malware classifiers from [24] , since many classifiers are covered, allowing us to evaluate the defense performance against many types of classifiers. The maximum input sequence length was limited to m = 140 API calls, since longer sequence lengths, e.g., m = 1000, had no effect on the accuracy, and padded shorter sequences with zeros. A zero stands for a null/dummy value API in our one-hot encoding. Longer sequences are split into windows of m API calls each, and each window is classified in turn. If any window is malicious, the entire sequence is considered malicious. Thus, the input of all of the classifiers is a vector of m = 140 API call types in one-hot encoding, using 314 bits, since there were 314 monitored API call types in the Cuckoo reports for the dataset. The output is a binary classification: malicious or benign. An overview of the LSTM architecture is shown in Figure 4 . The Keras implementation was used for all neural network classifiers, with TensorFlow used for the backend.
The loss function used for training was binary cross entropy. The Adam optimizer was used for all of the neural networks. The output layer was fully connected with sigmoid activation for all neural networks. For neural networks, a rectified linear unit, ReLU(x) = max(0, x), was chosen as an activation function for the input and hidden layers due to its fast convergence compared to sigmoid() or tanh(), and dropout was used to improve the generalization potential of the network. A batch size of 32 samples was used.
The classifiers also have the following classifier-specific hyperparameters:
• RNN, LSTM, GRU, BRNN, BLSTM, bidirectional GRU -a hidden layer of 128 units, with a dropout rate of 0.2 for both inputs and recurrent states.
• Deep LSTM and BLSTM -two hidden layers of 128 units, with a dropout rate of 0.2 for both inputs and recurrent states in both layers.
Classifier performance was measured using the accuracy ratio, which gives equal importance to both false positives and false negatives (unlike precision or recall). The false positive rate of the classifiers varied between 0.5-1%. The performance of the classifiers is shown in Table 2 . The accuracy was measured on the test set, which contains 36,000 samples. As can be seen in Table 2 , the LSTM variants are the best malware classifiers, in terms of accuracy. 
